INTRODUCTION
On June 24, 2010, the United States Supreme Court issued its muchanticipated decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.
1 After concluding that Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 does not apply extraterritorially, the Court announced a new standard for determining whether a particular securities transaction is subject to the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws. 2 Under this new transactional test, Section 10(b) applies only to purchases and sales of securities listed on U.S. stock exchanges and domestic transactions in other securities. 3 Although meant to be a bright-line rule, the transactional test has generated considerable controversy on account of its ambiguity. Plaintiffs have seized on this uncertainty to argue that securities fraud claims brought by U.S. investors against foreign issuers remained viable post-Morrison even when the relevant securities were purchased on foreign exchanges ("fsquared claims"). 4 To date, courts confronted with this argument have engaged in unnecessarily protracted analyses of the Supreme Court's rationale and policy objectives in announcing the test rather than focusing on the text of the transactional test itself.
This Article concludes that the transactional test's basis in the text of the Exchange Act provides the simplest, most direct means for disposing of f-squared claims. Part I provides a brief overview of the state of the law U. OF Part IV proposes a text-based rationale for dismissing f-squared claims that avoids the attenuated, policybased analyses employed by lower courts to date. Finally, Part V examines the proposed standard's applicability beyond the f-squared context.
I. THE CONDUCT AND EFFECTS TESTS
Prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Morrison, the Second Circuit employed two distinct tests to determine the extraterritorial reach of Section 10(b). Satisfaction of either test was sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction, and courts sometimes merged the tests to obtain jurisdiction over cases that could not satisfy either test independently. 5 The first analysis was known as the "effects test" and was announced in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook. 6 Under the effects test, subject matter jurisdiction was deemed to exist if "the wrongful conduct [abroad] had a substantial effect in the United States or upon United States citizens." 7 The second inquiry was known as the "conduct test" and was announced in Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell. 8 Under the conduct test, subject matter jurisdiction was deemed to exist if investors located abroad were harmed by conduct emanating from the United States. 9 Significantly, the quantity and quality of wrongful conduct necessary to confer jurisdiction varied depending on whether the injured investors were Americans: "When the alleged damages consisted of losses to American investors abroad, it was enough that acts 'of material importance' performed in the United States 'significantly contributed' to that result; whereas those acts must have 'directly caused' the result when losses to foreigners abroad were at issue." 10 In recognition of the Second Circuit's preeminence vis-à-vis application of the federal securities laws, variations of the conduct and effects tests were adopted by the Third, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits.
11
Although application of the effects test was relatively 
A. The Facts
National Australia Bank Ltd. ("National" or the "Bank"), a corporate entity organized under the laws of Australia and headquartered in Melbourne, 19 was Australia's largest bank. 20 Its ordinary shares-the equivalent of common stock in the United States-traded on the Australian Securities Exchange and other foreign securities exchanges but not on any U.S. exchange. 21 National's American Depositary Receipts, 22 however, were listed on the New York Stock Exchange. 23 In 1998, National acquired HomeSide Lending Incorporated ("HomeSide"), 24 a Florida-based mortgage servicing company. 25 Financial institutions paid HomeSide a fee to collect and process their customers' mortgage payments. 26 The servicing rights associated with these mortgages represented a future income stream to HomeSide, the present value of which depended, in part, on the likelihood that the underlying loans would be prepaid. 27 Consequently, to calculate the present value of HomeSide's mortgage-servicing rights, company executives had to make certain assumptions regarding the likelihood of prepayment. . . . receipt that is issued by a depositary bank that represents a specified amount of a foreign security that has been deposited with a foreign branch or agent of the depositary, known as the custodian. The holder of an ADR is not the title owner of the underlying shares; the title owner of those shares is either the depositary, the custodian, or their agent. ADRs are tradable in the same manner as any other registered American security, may be listed on any of the major exchanges in the United States or traded over the counter, and are subject to the [federal securities laws]. This makes trading an ADR simpler and more secure for American investors than trading in the underlying security in the foreign market.
Id. at *1 n. Initially, the acquisition appeared to be a boon for National. Between 1998 and 2001, the Bank consistently reported record profits.
30 National and three of the four individual defendants publicly attributed this success to strong performance by HomeSide.
31
On July 5, 2001, however, National announced that it would record a $450 million write-down to reflect the decreased value of HomeSide's mortgage-servicing rights. 32 In response, the price of National's ordinary shares and ADRs fell by more than 5%. 33 Then, on September 3, 2001, National announced a second write-down of $1.75 billion.
34
Of that amount, $400 million represented the devaluation of HomeSide's mortgage-servicing rights.
35
Another $760 million was attributed to mistaken assumptions in HomeSide's valuation model. The remaining $590 million represented loss of goodwill. 36 As a result of the September write-down, the price of National's ordinary shares fell by almost 13% while the price of its ADRs fell by more than 11%. The complaint alleged violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5. 40 Plaintiffs claimed that HomeSide "knowingly used unreasonably optimistic . . . assumptions or methodologies" in valuing its mortgage-servicing rights and that the defendants made materially false and misleading statements regarding HomeSide's "profitability, economic health, and its contribution to [National] -were Australian residents who purchased National's ordinary shares on the Australian Securities Exchange. 43 The Australian Plaintiffs sought to represent a class of foreign purchasers of National's ordinary shares. 44 The fourth plaintiff, Robert Morrison (the "Domestic Plaintiff"), 45 was a United States resident who purchased National's ADRs on the New York Stock Exchange. 46 Morrison sought to represent a class of American purchasers of National's ADRs. 47 
B. The District Court Opinion
On March 11, 2004, the defendants moved to dismiss the consolidated complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction with respect to the Australian Plaintiffs and for failure to state a claim with respect to the Domestic Plaintiff. 48 On October 25, 2006, Judge Barbara Jones granted both motions.
49
In ruling on the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Judge Jones' analysis focused on whether HomeSide's Florida-based activities were sufficient to satisfy the conduct test. The Australian Plaintiffs argued that but-for HomeSide's accounting manipulation in Florida, National's public statements would not have been fraudulent, whereas the defendants asserted that "the alleged securities fraud was committed-if at all-only when [National] distributed the allegedly false information . . . abroad."
50
Although a "close call," the court found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the Australian Plaintiffs' claims. 51 Specifically, Judge Jones held that the conduct test was not satisfied because HomeSide's activities in the United States were "at most, a link in the chain of an alleged overall securities fraud scheme that culminated abroad." 52 Before concluding, the court addressed the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim vis-à-vis the Domestic Plaintiff. After noting that economic loss is an essential element of a cognizable securities 42 At the outset of its opinion, the Second Circuit acknowledged that it was being called upon "to revisit the vexing question of the extraterritorial application of the securities laws."
57 After summarizing the relevant tests, the court noted that the appellants were not relying on the effects test to establish subject matter jurisdiction. 58 Consequently, the court limited its analysis to the conduct test, which required that the Second Circuit "identify which action or actions constituted the fraud and directly caused harm . . . and then determine if that act or those actions emanated from the United States."
59
The Second Circuit ultimately found that subject matter jurisdiction was lacking. The court held that "[t]he actions taken and the actions not taken by [National] in Australia were . . . significantly more central to the fraud and more directly responsible for the harm to investors than the manipulation of the numbers in Florida." 60 The court concluded its opinion by acknowledging: "When a statement or public filing [made by National] fails to meet [applicable accounting, legal, and regulatory] standards, the responsibility, as a practical matter, lies in Australia, not Florida." 61 Accordingly, the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the appellants' claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
In light of the uncertainty associated with the conduct test, the appellees invited the Second Circuit to adopt a bright-line rule regarding 53 62 The appellees argued that no amount of domestic conduct should be sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction if there was not some corresponding effect in the United States.
63
Because foreign-cubed cases, by definition, involve foreign investors suing foreign issuers in connection with securities transactions occurring on foreign exchanges, the relevant conduct in these cases does not have any U.S.-related effects. 64 Consequently, under the appellees' proposed rule, foreign-cubed cases would be without the subject matter jurisdiction of U.S. courts.
The appellees asserted that such a rule would be consistent with the presumption against extraterritoriality, a canon of statutory construction providing that unless a contrary intent appears, U.S. laws are "meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States."
65 Failure to adopt the appellees' proposed rule would allegedly "undermine the competitive and effective operation of American securities markets, discourage cross-border economic activity, . . . cause duplicative litigation [,] " and ensure international conflicts of law.
66
The Second Circuit declined the appellees' invitation, stating: "[W]e are leery of rigid bright-line rules . . . ."
67 With respect to the appellees' conflicts of law concerns, the court declared:
The problem of conflict between our laws and those of a foreign government is much less of a concern when the issue is the enforcement of the anti-fraud sections of the securities laws than with such provisions as those requiring registration of persons or securities. The reason is that while registration requirements may widely vary, anti-fraud enforcement objectives are broadly similar as governments and other regulators are generally in agreement that fraud should be discouraged.
68
The potential for conflict between Section 10(b) and the anti-fraud laws of foreign nations, thus, did not warrant abandoning the conduct and effects tests.
69
Moreover, the Second Circuit was concerned that the appellees' proposed rule would turn the United States into a "safe haven for securities cheaters" who would then export securities fraud to the rest of the world. 
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The court conceded, however, that "we are an American court, not the world's court, and we cannot and should not expend our resources resolving cases that do not affect Americans or involve fraud emanating from America." 71 The conduct and effects tests were held to adequately balance these competing concerns such that the court declined to adopt the appellees' proposed rule.
72

D. The Supreme Court Opinion
The question before the Supreme Court was "whether § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides a cause of action to foreign plaintiffs suing foreign and American defendants for misconduct in connection with securities traded on foreign exchanges."
73
The Court first addressed whether Section 10(b) applied extraterritorially. Justice Scalia noted that prior to 1968 the district courts in the Southern District of New York had consistently applied the presumption against extraterritoriality to hold that Section 10(b) did not reach fraud claims predicated on foreign stock transactions. Second, the tests were difficult to administer.
80
The conduct test varied depending on whether the harmed investors were Americans or foreigners, and satisfying the conduct test was not necessarily sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction since courts occasionally required that there be "'some additional factor tipping the scales' in favor of the application of American law."
81 Justice Scalia declared, " [t] here is no more damning indictment of the 'conduct' and 'effects' tests than the Second Circuit's own declaration that 'the presence or absence of any single factor which was considered significant in other cases . . . is not necessarily dispositive in future cases. '" 82 Third, variations of the conduct and effects tests had been adopted by the other circuits, resulting in an incoherent patchwork of tests for determining the extraterritorial application of Section 10(b).
83
Citing these failings, the Supreme Court rejected the conduct and effects tests in favor of a textual analysis of Section 10(b) as informed by the presumption against extraterritoriality. 84 After noting that "[o]n its face, § 10(b) contains nothing to suggest it applies abroad," Justice Scalia hen we deal with private actions under Rule 10b-5, we deal with a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn," Justice Scalia noted that:
. . . [t]he concurrence seemingly believes that the Courts of Appeals have carefully trimmed and sculpted this "judicial oak" into a cohesive canopy, under the watchful eye of Judge Henry Friendly, the "master arborist." Even if one thinks that the "conduct" and "effects" tests are numbered among Judge Friendly's many fine contributions to the law, his successors, though perhaps under the impression that they nurture the same mighty oak, are in reality tending each its own botanically distinct tree.
Id. at 2880 n.4 (internal citations omitted). 84. See id. at 2881 ("The criticisms seem to us justified. The results of judicialspeculation-made-law-divining what Congress would have wanted if it had thought of the situation before the court-demonstrate the wisdom of the presumption against extraterritoriality.").
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proceeded to consider and reject three text-based arguments for the extraterritorial application of Section 10(b). 85 First, the petitioners cited the Exchange Act's definition of "interstate commerce," a term used in Section 10(b), as evidence Congress intended to give the statute extraterritorial effect. 86 The Exchange Act defines "interstate commerce" to include "trade, commerce, transportation, or communication . . . between any foreign country and any State." 87 The Court dismissed this argument, stating, "[W]e have repeatedly held that even statutes that contain broad language in their definitions of 'commerce' that expressly refer to 'foreign commerce' do not apply abroad." 88 Consequently, a single reference to foreign commerce within a statutory definition was deemed insufficient to rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality. 89 Next, the petitioners pointed to Congress' purpose in enacting the Exchange Act as evidence that Section 10(b) was meant to apply abroad.
90
The prologue to the Exchange Act provides that "prices established and offered in such transactions are generally disseminated and quoted throughout the United States and foreign countries." 91 In rejecting this argument, the Supreme Court observed that the antecedent of "such transactions" was located "in the first sentence of the section, which declares that 'transactions in securities as commonly conducted upon securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets are affected with a national public interest. ' Justice Scalia reasoned that this "explicit provision for a specific extraterritorial application would be quite superfluous if the rest of the Exchange Act already applied to transactions on foreign exchanges-and its limitation of that application to securities of domestic issuers would be inoperative." 
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transactions.
103
After concluding that Section 10(b) does not apply extraterritorially, the Court addressed the petitioners' argument that they were seeking only a domestic application of the Exchange Act.
104 Emphasizing the extent of HomeSide's Florida-based activities, the petitioners asserted that the respondents' conduct was sufficiently domestic to state a claim under Section 10(b).
105
Justice Scalia dismissed the petitioners' argument, reasoning that "the focus of the Exchange Act is not upon the place where the deception originated, but upon purchases and sales of securities in the United States."
106 He went on to note that "Section 10(b) does not punish deceptive conduct, but only deceptive conduct 'in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered.'" 107 Thus, even assuming that the conduct constituting the alleged fraud occurred entirely within the United States, the consolidated complaint failed to state a claim because the petitioners-all of whom were Australian-purchased their shares on the Australian Securities Exchange.
108
The Court then announced a new "transactional test" for determining the reach of Section 10(b). 109 The opinion contains three articulations of the test, each slightly different in its phrasing and terminology:
1. "And it is in our view only transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges, and domestic transactions in other securities, to which § 10(b) applies. 
III. F-SQUARED CASES POST-MORRISON
Although meant to be a bright-line rule, the transactional test has proven difficult to administer for two reasons. First, the Supreme Court failed to provide a single, coherent articulation of the test. Instead, the opinion contains three variations of the test, each containing subtle yet potentially significant differences. Second, the various articulations are poorly drafted. 116 The Court mistakes brevity for clarity, failing to define certain key terms or otherwise specify the precise contours of the test. Thus, rather than curing the uncertainty that plagued the conduct and effects tests, the transactional test has cast what was previously a semistable area of the law into abject confusion.
A. F-Squared Plaintiffs' Attempts to Circumvent Morrison
Plaintiffs seeking to preserve f-squared claims argue that Morrison should be limited to its facts so that only f-cubed cases are outside the scope of Section 10(b). They contend that Morrison's holding turned on the fact that "all aspects of the purchases complained of . . . occurred outside the United States" such that "the Supreme Court did not addressand did not foreclose-the claims of U.S. investors who purchased securities on a foreign exchange, where 'aspects of the purchase' occurred in the United States." Plaintiffs ostensibly find support for their "some domestic aspects" argument in the text of the transactional test. While conceding that securities listed exclusively on foreign exchanges cannot satisfy the "securities listed on domestic exchanges" prong of the test, f-squared plaintiffs contend that transactions in such securities may nevertheless qualify as "domestic transactions in other securities" so long as aspects of the transactions occur in the United States.
By focusing on the purportedly domestic aspects of their purchases, fsquared plaintiffs seek to replace the Court's bright-line rule with a factintensive inquiry reminiscent of the conduct and effects tests. Consider, for example, the arguments put forth by the plaintiff-a U.S. institutional investor-in the Swiss Reinsurance Company securities fraud class action litigation. 118 There, the plaintiff asserted that its purchases of Swiss Re stock on the Swiss stock exchange constituted "domestic transactions" within the meaning of the transactional test because the plaintiff "made the decision to invest in Swiss Re stock, and initiated the purchase of Swiss Re stock, from the United States." 119 In support of its contention, the Swiss Re plaintiff cited the following facts:
As set forth in the accompanying affidavit of Tremaine Atkinson, the Chief Operating Officer at LSV Asset Management ("LSV"), the Chicago-based brokerage firm authorized to make trades on behalf of [ 
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123
Specifically, the defendants asserted that the plaintiff's affidavit was "silent regarding what happened after LSV placed the orders-where the orders were sent or where the trades were executed, cleared and settled." 124 In an attempt to fill in the missing pieces, the defendants cited the following facts:
In The defendants asserted that although the investment decisions and purchase orders may have originated in Chicago, the trades were actually executed, cleared, and settled in Europe such that they constituted foreign transactions outside the scope of Section 10(b).
126
The Swiss Re case, thus, illustrates precisely the sort of subjective, fact-intensive inquiry the Supreme Court sought to avoid in announcing its new transactional test. 127 If lower courts were to hold that Section 10(b) applies whenever the underlying securities transaction has "some domestic aspects," this sort of analysis would be required in virtually every f-squared case.
B. Lower Courts' Application of the Transactional Test
As of the date of publication, no court had been persuaded by the "some domestic aspects" interpretation of the transactional test. In dismissing f-squared claims, however, district courts have ignored arguably the simplest and most direct means for disposing of these cases.
Consider Judge Marrero predicated his dismissal of the plaintiffs' f-squared claims on three grounds. 131 First, the "some domestic aspects" interpretation of the transactional test improperly sought to revive the conduct and effects tests. Second, under the plaintiffs' theory, U.S. courts "would be called upon to enforce American laws regulating transactions in securities that are also governed by the laws of the foreign country and exchanges where those securities were actually purchased or sold" in contravention of Morrison.
132 Third, the Supreme Court had signaled that semi-domestic securities transactions would not satisfy the transactional test. 133 For Judge Marrero, the Morrison Court's citation to Aramco 134 provided additional evidence "that the presumption against extraterritorial effect should not be diminished just because 'some domestic activity is involved in the case. '" 135 In Aramco, the Supreme Court affirmed the transactions occurred within United States territory, and then to apply value judgments to determine whether the cluster of those activities sufficed to cross over the threshold of enough domestic contacts to justify extraterritorial application of § 10(b)"); see also 
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dismissal of a lawsuit brought by an American citizen against two of his former employers, both Delaware corporations, for discriminatory conduct that allegedly occurred while the plaintiff was working for the defendants in Saudi Arabia. 136 After concluding that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not apply extraterritorially, the Supreme Court held that dismissal was warranted even though the plaintiff was a U.S. citizen and had been hired by the defendants in Houston, Texas. 137 Consequently, Judge Marrero concluded that securities transactions may have some domestic aspects and still be outside the scope of Section 10(b). 138 Thus, rather than relying solely on the text of the transactional test to hold that the defendants were entitled to judgment on the pleadings vis-à-vis those plaintiffs who purchased Credit Suisse shares on the Swiss Stock Exchange, Judge Marrero instead engaged in an unnecessarily protracted analysis of the Morrison Court's rationale and policy objectives.
139
Several weeks later, Judge Marrero dismissed the claims of another fsquared plaintiff in an unrelated case, relying solely on his opinion in Credit Suisse. 140 Other judges have similarly relied on Credit Suisse to dismiss f-squared plaintiffs' claims-often without articulating any independent rationale of their own. The Exchange Act defines the term "purchase" to include "any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire."
144 Citing Second Circuit precedent, the Swiss Re plaintiff argued that an individual becomes a purchaser within the meaning of the Exchange Act "when he or she incur[s] an irrevocable liability to take and pay for the stock," i.e., at the moment the investor places a buy order. 145 Because the relevant buy orders were placed by brokers located in Chicago, the plaintiff asserted that its purchases of Swiss Re common stock occurred in the U.S.
146 Judge Koeltl noted that other courts considering f-squared claims had "unanimously rejected" this argument and reasoned that the term "purchase" must be construed so as to avoid the international conflicts of law concerns raised in Morrison. 147 Consequently, the court held that "as a general matter, a purchase order in the United States for a security that is sold on a foreign exchange is insufficient to subject the purchase to the coverage of section 10(b) of the Exchange Act."
148
After finding that the trades were executed, cleared, and settled in Europe, Judge Koeltl proceeded to reject the plaintiff's arguments that these were nevertheless domestic securities transactions within the scope of Section 10(b). First, the court held that the plaintiff's status as a U.S. resident was irrelevant: "A purchaser's citizenship or residency does not affect where a transaction occurs; a foreign resident can make a purchase within the United States, and a United States resident can make a purchase outside the United States."
149 Second, the fact that the investment decision was made in Chicago had "no bearing on where the stock was ultimately In announcing the transactional test, Justice Scalia sought to justify his use of the term "listed" rather than "registered" by noting that the Exchange Act's "registration requirements apply only to securities listed on national securities exchanges."
160
The transactional test's basis in the text of Section 10(b) has significant implications for plaintiffs seeking to assert f-squared claims. Specifically, if the "transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges" prong of the test corresponds to the "purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange" provision of Section 10(b), then the "domestic transactions in other securities" prong of the test necessarily corresponds to the "any security not so registered" provision of the statute. Consequently, Congress's motivation for including the phrase "any security not so registered" in the text of Section 10(b) is directly relevant to how lower courts interpret the "domestic transactions in other securities" prong of the transactional test.
The Exchange Act's legislative history reveals that Congress included the phrase "any security not so registered" to provide for the regulation of the domestic over-the-counter markets, not foreign securities exchanges. 161 As originally drafted, the Act regulated only purchases and sales of registered securities. 162 The phrase "any security not so registered" was subsequently added to prevent a large-scale exodus from the national text as on the presumption against extraterritoriality."); see also George T. Conway, III, Postscript to Morrison v. National Australia Bank, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 14, 2010, at 5 (acknowledging that the transactional test's "reference to 'the purchase or sale of a security listed on an American stock exchange'-derives from § 10(b)'s reference to 'the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange'").
159. 
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BUT I'M AN AMERICAN! 537 securities exchanges. 163 Congress feared that if the Act's scope was limited to registered securities, companies would de-list from the national exchanges in favor of selling their securities in the over-the-counter markets. 164 The inclusion of the phrase "any security not so registered" was designed to remove this incentive by bringing the over-the-counter markets within the purview of the Exchange Act. 165 The statutory text confirms that regulation of the domestic over-thecounter markets was a key objective of the Seventy-Third Congress. The Exchange Act's prologue acknowledges that "transactions in securities as commonly conducted upon securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets are affected with a national public interest which makes it necessary to provide for regulation and control of such transactions." The United States Supreme Court has likewise recognized that "[t]he 1934 Act was intended principally to protect investors against manipulation of stock prices through regulation of transactions upon securities exchanges and in over-the-counter markets." 168 Thus, for the purposes of the transactional test, the most logical reading of the phrase "domestic transactions in other securities" is "transactions in the domestic over-the-counter market." 169 This distinction U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 14:2 is significant to the extent it excludes transactions conducted on exchange markets from the "domestic transactions in other securities" prong of the transactional test. Whereas exchange markets are "auction markets where the orders of buyers and sellers are concentrated for the purpose of offering transactions through the meeting of the highest bid and the lowest offer,"
170
"the over-the-counter market is a negotiated market in which . . . dealers acting as principals buy from and sell to investors or other dealers at an undisclosed profit." 171 Consequently, U.S. investors' purchase of securities on foreign exchanges would not qualify as "transactions in the domestic over-the-counter market" under the proposed reading of the transactional test.
This text-based rationale arguably provides the simplest, most direct means for disposing of f-squared claims post-Morrison. Had the Supreme Court simply affirmed the dismissal of the Australian Plaintiffs' claims without bothering to articulate a new test for determining the scope of Section 10(b), lower courts would be justified in relying on the rationale underlying the Morrison Court's holding. In announcing the transactional test, however, the Supreme Court sought to limit lower courts' analyses to whether the relevant transactions involved a security listed on a domestic stock exchange or traded in the domestic over-the-counter market. To date, the construction advocated in this Article represents the only text-based rationale for dismissing f-squared claims under the transactional test.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEWLY-CLARIFIED TRANSACTIONAL TEST
As demonstrated in Section IV, supra, securities transactions in the domestic over-the-counter market remain subject to the antifraud U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 14:2
Moreover, the judge incorrectly asserted that dismissal of the ADR Plaintiff's claims was supported by Credit Suisse.
183
In Credit Suisse, however, Judge Marrero's dismissal order was limited to claims brought by investors who purchased Credit Suisse shares on the Swiss Stock Exchange, and the claims of investors who purchased ADRs on the New York Stock Exchange were allowed to proceed. 184 The authority relied upon by the judge, thus, did not support dismissal of the ADR Plaintiff's claims. Although the ruling is arguably ripe for reversal as a result, had the court undertaken a text-based analysis of the transactional test, the error of its reasoning would have been plain. Application of the transactional test would have revealed that the ADR Plaintiff's claims necessarily survive post-Morrison for the simple reason that they are predicated on securities transactions in the domestic over-thecounter market.
Another opinion that is questionable in light of the newly-clarified transactional test is Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Homm.
185
In that case, a group of Cayman Island based hedge funds ("Funds") 186 claimed to be the victims of a pump-and-dump scheme orchestrated by certain defendants, including the Funds' Europe-based investment manager. 187 According to the amended complaint, the scheme worked as follows: After obtaining control of a dormant or near dormant shell company, the defendants would cause one or more of the Funds to purchase a subscription for the company's shares. 188 The defendants, meanwhile, would already own large quantities of the company's shares or have the company issue shares and warrants to them in exchange for arranging the Funds' purchases. 189 Thereafter, the defendants would cause the Funds to trade and re-trade "the stocks many times over, sometimes on the same day, between and among [ . . in which the Funds were caused to purchase the illiquid shares directly from the companies through private placements. At no point were the shares released to the general market. In fact, the entire "market" alleged was the trading by and between the Funds.
194
Consequently, the court found that dismissal was warranted because the Funds' trades did not satisfy the transactional test.
195
In reaching its holding, however, the court appears to have been preoccupied with the manner in which the Funds initially acquired the securities such that it failed to consider the impact of the subsequent intraFunds trades used to inflate the securities' prices. 196 Moreover, the court's application of the transactional test was limited to evaluating whether the trades constituted "transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges" under the first prong of the test without considering whether the trades qualified as "domestic transactions in other securities" under the second prong of the test.
197
As noted previously, two of the defendants, Todd 198 Ficeto, meanwhile, was Hunter's president and a registered securities agent in several U.S. states. 199 Thus, although the buy and sell orders for the intra-Funds trades may have originated in Europe, the actual trades arguably took place in the domestic over-the-counter market such that they satisfy Morrison under the newly-clarified transactional test. 200 At the very least, the parties should have been given an opportunity to brief the impact of Morrison so that a better-developed factual record would exist regarding the precise nature of the intra-Funds trades. 201 
CONCLUSION
In announcing the transactional test, the Morrison Court sought to create a new, bright-line rule that would avoid the unpredictability and inconsistency of the conduct and effects tests. In application, the transactional test has thrust a reasonably well-settled area of the law into abject confusion. This outcome was inevitable in light of the Court's inability to commit to a single articulation of the test and its concomitant failure to define the test's precise scope and contours. Nonetheless, this Article argues that by examining the statutory text from which the transactional test was derived, a bright-line rule may still be salvaged from Morrison.
